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The Advent of Gene Patenting: Putting the
Great Debate in Perspective
Brian Zadorozny *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Genetic engineering has changed, and will continue to change, the
world in which we live. Human beings can now directly manipulate the
characteristics and structure of other organisms' genes. This practice can be
used for socially beneficial purposes, such as genetically modifying agriculture to increase its resistance to viruses and decrease the need for pesticides
or herbicides, thereby generating a higher crop yield. Genetic modification
has also led to many advances in medicine, including the creation of synthetic human insulin and the ability to treat a host of genetic disorders. Other
scientific breakthroughs have been achieved using genetic engineering as
well. Phillip Leder and Timothy Stewart, two Harvard medical researchers,
genetically modified mice to carry an oncogene, increasing the susceptibility
to cancer and making the animal ideal for cancer research., Upon this event,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") issued the first patent for a transgenic animal on April 12, 1998.2 In 1999, Peter Beyer and
Ingo Potrykus discovered that beta-carotene could be produced in rice by
introducing two transgenes (phytoene synthase and bacterial carotene
desaturase) not found in the original rice compound.3 The result, "Golden
Rice," has the capabilities of providing the recommended daily allowance of
vitamin A to many children in developing countries,4 creating a solution for
the half a million children who are at risk of becoming blind annually due to
vitamin A deficiency.5 In May 2001, genetic engineering allowed a woman
suffering from infertility due to mitochondrial defects to have children with
the help of a donor cell. 6 StemCells, Inc., a biotechnology firm based out of
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Palo Alto, California, transplanted human stem cells into the brains of mice
in an attempt to cure neurodegenerative diseases.7 In January 2009, a study
from the Thomas Jefferson University's Center for Transitional Medicine indicated that long-term gene therapy improved the cardiac function of rats
with heart failure.9 There is a steady progression in the uses of gene therapy
that is culminating in its increased use in human medicine and agriculture.
All of these scientific advances have an additional common denominator aside from the use and development of genetic science. Underlying each
of these discoveries is a patent that protects the holder's claim or process.
Moreover, the patent owner has the ability to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the patented gene(s) within the United States.9 Currently,
there is a fierce debate concerning the ability of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies' ability to obtain gene patents. Part II of this article
briefly outlines some historical highlights of biotechnology and gene patents
and provides a background for understanding the current debate. Part III
explores the arguments advanced by both sides and identifies some underlying assumptions and misconceptions regarding those arguments. Lastly, part
IV discusses the legal and ethical implications that have resulted from the
current patent scheme as it relates to genetic engineering. The primary objective of this article is to put the controversial topic of human gene patenting
into perspective. By analyzing the positions of both sides, greater clarity and
understanding can be obtained and the ethical and legal implications can be
more concretely examined. Additionally, this article aims to put to rest many
of the misunderstandings that exist regarding gene patenting.
Scholars have noted that the definition of what constitutes a gene patent
is unclear.o Although the phrase "gene patent" implies that the patent is
issued regarding a specific gene, this article uses the phrase in a broader
sense. A gene patent can refer to a specific gene sequence, a sequence of
DNA, the usage of the gene sequence, or its chemical composition.
Before delving into the development of biotechnology and the arguments surrounding gene patents, it is useful to identify what is not within the
scope of this article. First, this article does not discuss the development of
the patentability of genetic inventions. While the appropriateness of patenting nucleotide sequences is vehemently debated, the official position of the
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PTO is clear. As long as the invention meets the requirements of a patent
(novelty, utility, and non-obviousness), the substance, use, and derivatives of
the DNA can be patented."[ Furthermore, many different aspects of genetic
inventions are claimed in the patent applications. Partial DNA sequences,
such as expressed sequence tags ("ESTs") and single-nucleotide polymorphisms ("SNPs"),12 uses of genetic sequences, tests for specific genetic diseases,13 and proteins encoded by genes and their functions,14 are all
patentable. However, the treatment of genes, and their associated applications, as patentable material has not always been recognized; there have been
many obstacles to overcome in order to achieve the current patentability status.' 5 Second, this article does not deeply explore or explain the chemistry
behind many of the gene patents. Due to the extremely complex and technical nature of biotechnology, many of the inventions are difficult to describe
in a brief manner. Therefore, the focus of this article will be on the implications of the patents and not on the specific patents themselves.
This article proposes that the patent system is a necessary evil in order
to effectively protect the intellectual property inherent in the genetic engineering process. The utilitarian view, a view that considers and weighs the
risks and benefits of the practice and subsequently decides whether or not
society will benefit as a whole, is the strongest perspective through which to
view the debate. While deontological arguments have a place in deciding
how the practice should be regulated, arguments that focus solely on the
rightness of an action as determined by its consequences, and conclude that
genetic patenting should be banned based on moral wrongness deserve less
attention. Many of the arguments proposed against gene patents rely on theories that have not been substantiated by research or misconceptions about
the rights a patent confers. However, opponents do raise legitimate concerns
that must be considered and balanced when deciding if reform is necessary.
Furthermore, this article suggests many improvements and identifies areas in
need of further research.
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GENE PATENTS: PUTTING THE
DEBATE IN CONTEXT

The biotechnology industry emerged in the 1970's due to a new recombinant DNA technique.16 In 1973, Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen reported the construction of functional organisms that combined and replicated
genetic information from different species.'7 Essentially, Boyer and Cohen
are credited with discovering and demonstrating recombinant DNA
processes.1 s Then, in 1980 the Supreme Court vastly expedited the advent of
gene patenting by holding that genetically modified Eubacteria constituted
patentable subject matter.19 The Court construed the language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 broadly, citing legislative history as evidence that a liberal construction should be provided.20 In 1980, Congress amended title 35 of the United
States Code to articulate the policy objectives and goals of the patent system.
The statute states:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum
participation of small business firms and federally supported research and development efforts; to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to insure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote
free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the United States by
United States industry and labor; to ensure that the government
obtained sufficient rights in federally supported invention to meet
the needs of the government and protect the public against nonuse
or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of
administering policies in this area.2 1
This law, the Bayh-Dole Act (hereinafter the "Act"), was a government
initiative to promote commercial development of new technologies and fur-
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ther privatize biomedical research.22 The Act allows universities to patent
inventions that result from government-funded research. As a result, over
4,500 firms have developed non-profit research institutes, based on patents
generated as a consequence of this law.23 American universities and institutes grossed $1.39 billion in licensing revenue and applied for more than
10,000 new patents in 2004 alone.24 Between 1985 and 1995, the United
States government invested more than $50 billion in the biological sciences
and actively encouraged private-sector investment.25 This legislation had
dramatic economic effects and is extremely controversial to this day.
Another foundational case that set the standard for allowing patenting of
altered genetic products was decided in July of 1990 in Moore v. Regents of
the University of California.26 In Moore, the plaintiff was a patient at the

UCLA Medical Center who underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia.27
Before having his spleen removed, one of the doctors gave the surgeons written instructions to have a portion of plaintiff's spleen obtained for research
purposes without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff.28 After the medical procedure, the plaintiff was told to return to the Medical Center for treatment numerous times, purportedly because it was necessary for his health
and well-being.29 During these follow-up visits, the researchers took additional samples and established a cell line from the plaintiff's T-lymphocytes. 30 The cell line was recognized as commercially valuable because the
plaintiffs T-lymphocytes overproduced a particular lymphokine whose corresponding genetic material was easily identifiable, and the researchers later
obtained a patent for the specific cell line.31 Regarding the plaintiff's action
for conversion, the court held the plaintiff did not have a property interest in
the patented subject matter "because the patented cell line is both factually
22.

See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698-701 (May 1,

1998).
23.

Bayhing for Blood or Doling out Cash?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at

109.
24.

Id.

25. Joseph Fuller & Brock Reeve, Will We Lose in the Stem Cell Race?,

WASH.

POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201525.html?referrer-emailarticle.
26. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
27.

See id. at 480.

28.

See id. at 481.

29.

See id.

30.

Id.

31.

See id. at 482; U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (filed Jan. 6, 1983) (patenting the cell
line and the products derived from it).
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and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore's body."32 The cell line
constituted a product of "human ingenuity," not naturally occurring, and patentable because "long-term adaptation and growth of human tissues and cells
in culture is difficult . . . and the probability of success is low."33
Subsequently, the biotechnology industry experienced an economic
boom. From 1992 to 2006, U.S. healthcare biotech revenues from publicly
traded companies grew from $8 billion to $58.8 billion.34 The Human Genome Project ("HGP"), which began in 1990 to identify all the genes in
human DNA, was completed in 2003.35 The completion of the project resulted in an explosion for companies in the private sector, both large and
small, who sought to utilize the data gathered by the HGP in a number of
different applications.36 One such biopharmaceutical company was Myriad
Genetics, the discoverer of genes BRCAl and BRCA2, which are involved
with DNA damage repair.37 After the discovery, Myriad Genetics obtained
patents for BRCAl, and, more specifically, the methods and materials used
to isolate and detect a human breast cancer predisposing gene.3 8 Five months
later, Myriad Genetics was granted a patent on BRCA2 and its corresponding
genetic screening tests. 39 The patents were extremely broad and covered
many mutations of the two genes, as well as the use of these mutations for
diagnosis and prognosis of breast and ovarian cancer, among other uses. 40
Subsequently, Myriad Genetics was granted a patent by the European Patent

32.

See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.

33.

See id. at 492-93.

BIO, Biotechnology Industry Facts, http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
35. Human Genome Project Information, http://www.omI.gov/sci/techresources/
Human Genome/ home.shtml (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
36. The Human Genome Project & the Private Sector: A Working Partnership, On
the Shoulders of Giants: Private Sector Leverages HGP Successes: Data, Tech34.

nologies Catalyze a New, High-ProfileLife Sciences Industry, http://www.oml.
gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/project/privatesector.shtmIl (last visited
Jan. 18, 2009).
37.

Genetic Testing for Hereditary Cancer Syndromes Resource Guide: BRCAl
and BRCA2 Genes, http://www.myriadresourceguide.com/bracanal/genes.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009).

38.

U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001
(filed June 7, 1995).

39.
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Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L. J. 123-46 (2002) (providing a more

elaborate explanation of the race to patent BRCAl and BRCA2).
40.
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Office for BRCAl in January 2001 and for BRCA2 in May 2001.41 Institutions and society at large became uneasy as genetic engineering rapidly advanced and was assimilated into the medical standard of care. For example,
on August 2, 1999, the American College of Medical Genetics ("ACMG")
issued a position statement on gene patents and accessibility of gene testing.
The institution stated that genes and their mutations are naturally occurring
substances that should not be patented, and licensing agreements should not
limit patient access through excess royalties and other unreasonable terms. 42
On March 9, 2000, Myriad Genetics announced that it had exclusively
licensed MDS Laboratory Services to make available the BRACAnalysis
molecular diagnostic tests to women across Canada who may be at risk of
breast and ovarian cancer. 43 Subsequent to this, Myriad Genetics signed exclusive licensing agreements with companies across the globe from Japan44
to Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.45 U.S. Representative Lynn Rivers
introduced the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,
which creates an exemption from patent infringement for researchers who
use genetic-based diagnostic tests for noncommercial purposes. 46 International organizations held workshops to discuss the proliferation of gene patents and their implications. In January 2002, the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development ("OECD"), an international institution that
collects data and monitors trends regarding economic developments,4 7 held a

41.

European Parliament resolution on the patenting of BRCA1 and BRCA2
('breast cancer') genes, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/biotech/eu-brca.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

42. American College of Medical Genetics, Position Statement on Gene Patents
and Accessibility of Gene Testing, http://genetics.faseb.org/genetics/acmg/pol34.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
43.

Myriad Genetics Launches Molecular Diagnostic Testing in Canada, MDS
Laboratory Services to Provide BRACAnalysis@ Throughout Canada, http://
www.corporate-ir.net/ireve/irsite.zhtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

44.

Myriad Genetics Launches Genetic Testing in Japan, Falco biosystems, Ltd. to
Promote Myriad's Commercial Products in Japan, http://www.corporate-ir.net/
ireye/ir.site.zhtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

45.

Myriad Genetics Launches Predictive Medicine Testing in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, http://www.chemie.de/news/d/3678/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2009).

46. Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th
Cong. (2002).
47. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, About OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en-36734052_36734103_1 1 1-1-,00.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
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meeting in Berlin, Germany to identify any problems in obtaining legal access to genetic inventions.48
Other organizations have tried to provide guidance regarding the emerging issues in genetic engineering. For example, the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH"), Public Health Service ("PHS") and Health and Human Services ("HHS") combined efforts in 2004, announcing recommendations regarding the best practices for the licensing of genomic inventions.49 Their
recommendations included carefully distinguishing between inventions requiring exclusive licensing with those that would be best disseminated nonexclusively in the marketplace. 50 The guidelines suggested that patents covering diagnostics should be licensed on a nonexclusive basis, and universities
should not patent genomic technologies if significant research and development is unnecessary to get a product to market.51 The thrust of the guidelines
was to target questionable licensing practices that had the potential to inhibit
access to genetic information.
In 1998, Andrew Z. Fire and Craig C. Mello discovered a cellular process called RNA interference ("RNAi") whereby short, double-stranded
RNA fragments trigger suppression of gene activity through cellular enzymes
in a homology-dependent manner. 52 For their discovery, they received the
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2006.53 The discovery of RNAi
marked a milestone in genetic engineering, as it has allowed for greater control in regulating gene expressions. RNAi can influence the development of
an organism by suppressing protein synthesis.54 Furthermore, RNAi-like
mechanisms keep chromatin condensed and suppress transcription.55 This
realization of greater genetic control has already been utilized in gene therapy and raises the possibility for its use in medical treatments. 56 For example, Deborah Palliser and her colleagues have shown that small interfering
See Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices
(2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf.
49. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 69 Fed. Reg. 67747
(proposed Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/69FR6774
7.pdf.

48.

50.
51.

See id.
Aparna Surendran, US NIH Draft Guidelines Threaten Diagnostics Sector, NAMay 2004, at 496, available at http://www.nature.com.

TURE BIOTECHNOLOGY,

52.

proxy.libraries.smu.edu/nbt/journal/v22/n5/full/nbtO5O4-496.html.
Nobelprize.org, Advanced Information: The 2006 Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine, 1-2, http://nobelprizeorg/nobel-prizes/medicine/laureates/2006/adv.
pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 6.

55.

Id. at 7.

56.

Id.
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RNAs ("siRNAs") can protect mice from lethal herpes simplex virus 2 infections.57 Other researchers have shown that a non-human primate's siRNAs
can silence apolipoprotein B ("APOB"), the primary component of low-density lipoprotein ("LDL") cholesterol and what is lowered in most medications
designed to treat hypercholesterolaemia.58 The researchers claim that their
"findings show clinically relevant RNAi-mediated gene silencing in nonhuman primates, supporting RNAi therapeutics as a potential new class of
drugs" and "the rapid and long lasting silencing of APOB using RNAi may
represent a new strategy for reducing LDL-cholesterol in several relevant
clinical settings."59
In 2006, the biosciences employed 1.3 million people in the United
States and generated an additional 7.5 million jobs.60 The potential dangers
of genetic engineering caught the eye of the late science fiction writer
Michael Crichton. In November 2006, Crichton published a techno-thriller
novel entitled Next delving into some of the controversial aspects of genetic
engineering and theorizing about the potential implications of such engineering.61 Crichton did more than publish a fictional book about the implications
of gene patenting, however. On September 14, 2006, while speaking to Congressional staff members, Crichton claimed that genes cannot be owned because they are facts of nature, the gene patents are vague, and the patents
discourage research and hurt patient care. 62 He purported that gene patents
would negatively affect patient care because the patent holder essentially has
a monopoly on the patented material and can choose when and how to make
the product of gene patenting available and has the power to set the standard
fee of associated diagnostic testing and therapeutic treatment. 63 Mounting
public concern about the ethical implications of gene patenting reached an
apex on February 9, 2007, when U.S. Congressman Xavier Becerra introduced legislation, the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act ("GRAA"),
that would prohibit the patenting of human genetic material.M Specifically,
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Deborah Palliser et al., An siRNA -based Microbicide Protects Mice from Lethal
Herpes Simplex Virus 2 Infection, NATURE, Jan. 5, 2006 at 89.
Tracy S. Zimmermann et al., RNAi-Mediated Gene Silencing in Non-Human
Primates, NATURE, May 4, 2006 at 111.

Id. at Ill, 113.
BIO, Biotechnology Industry Facts, http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
MichaelCrichton.com, Next, http://www.michaelcrichton.com/books-next-history.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
MichaelCrichton.com, Genetic Research and Legislative Needs, http://www.
michaelcrichton.com/speech-legislativestaffers.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
Id.

64. See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(1st Sess. 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname= 110_congbills&docid=f:h977ih.txt.pdf.
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the GRAA sought to ban the patenting of "a nucleotide sequence, or its functions or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies."65 More
recently, however, the bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property, which has not pursued it any further.66
Most recently, on May 21, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 ("GINA") into law,
which imposes certain restrictions on health-care providers for genetic testing.67 The law amends portions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and the Public Health
Service Act. 6 8 More specifically, GINA prohibits group health plans and
health insurers from requesting or requiring an individual to undergo a genetic test.6 9 GINA also prohibits the denial of coverage to a healthy individual and prohibits charging a person higher premiums based solely on a
genetic predisposition to developing a future disease.70
III.

THE GREAT DEBATE: EXPLORING THE ARGUMENTS

There is little doubt that genetic engineering will become increasingly
important in the years to come. Parents will have the choice to genetically
modify their offspring in a myriad of ways. By identifying and analyzing the
different arguments advanced by either side and, more importantly, debunking the arguments or theories that do not have merit, society will have a
better framework to view these important decisions. The first part of this
section will elaborate on the arguments relied on by proponents of gene patenting. The second part will address positions of individuals who oppose
gene patenting.
It is important to clarify a misnomer about a patent owner's rights to a
gene. Often, people confuse personal property rights and rights granted by a
patent. Among the numerous property rights is the "right to use," which
entitles an individual to control his or her physical genes and grants them
bodily integrity and freedom of person. An individual essentially has real
property rights in his or her genes, which is extremely valuable because a
person's genes are in essence the makeup of humanity and individuality. An
individual's genetic makeup determines the genetic code of his or her offspring and also contributes to the cumulative commercial value of providing
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
H.R. 977, The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/l 10_HR_977.html (last visited November 30,
2009).
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. I 10-233,
122 Stat. 881 (2008).
Id. at 883-96.
Id. at 883.
Id.
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genetic information to further scientific research.7' A gene patent does not
threaten the principle of an individual's rights to their own genes, but merely
entitles the patent owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
physical molecule.72
However, some critics overestimate the amount of control a patent
holder has in their invention. For example, Congressman Becerra's website
states "[t]wenty percent of these genes have already been patented and we
have absolutely no say in what those patent holders do with our genes."73 At
the issuance of the patent, the information is freely available for other researchers who are "not prevent[ed] . . . from perceiving, using, and analyzing

information about what the DNA sequence is."74 As such, in no way does
the holder have any claim to the integrity of the person.
This argument is mistaken for several reasons. First, the researcher who
holds a patent on an individual's cell line does not have the absolute power to
compel him or her to undergo further testing or treatment. If one does not
wish for his or her blood or tissue to be used for the development of genetic
research resulting in a patent, they are under no obligation to consent. Second, a human gene patent is limited to the patentable subject matter as defined by the claims.75 Due to the complex and technical nature of gene
patents that cover a wide range of processes and inventions, the claims made
are often narrowly defined, which limits the exclusion to a very precise methodology.76 Researchers are free to utilize all genetic information in other
contexts. 77 Furthermore, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") reTampering with our future generation using genetic enhancements raises a
plethora of ethical issues which will be discussed later.
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2006).
71.

73.

Xavier Becerra, Common sense legislation that will end the practice of gene

patenting, http://becerra.house.gov/HoR/CA31/Issues/genepatents.htm.
74.
75.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the
Value of the DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 788 (2000).
See generally Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on
Innovation and Access: a Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC

L. REV. 295, 359-60 (2007) (stating that the overall pressing problem of U.S.
patent law is the over-expansive definition of patentable subject matter but that
gene patents have had a relatively minor impact in this way).
76. See generally id. at 360 (expressing that the legislature should focus on the
"wider problem of patents that broadly claim any practical application of fundamental biological discoveries" and that the most problematic patents have
primarily not claimed genes or gene-related inventions).
77. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding researcher was free to make human PI using a semisynthetic DNA to yield a cleavable fusion protein because the University failed
to provide an adequate written description to the human insulin gene they
broadly defined in their patent).
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stricts use of gene patents by regulating articles that fall within their jurisdiction. For example, the FDA has exerted jurisdiction over cloning and certain
aspects of gene therapy, as well as assisted reproductive technology and stem
cell research. 78 Lastly, the right a patent holder has in the invention is limited
because the patent expires after twenty years from its earliest filing date.79
For all of these reasons, the patent holder does not have carte blanche authority to "do what he wants with your genes."
A.

The Case for Gene Patents

The majority of arguments in support of gene patenting focus on utilitarian justifications. Essentially, proponents argue that patenting genetic sequences, including their derivatives and methodologies, ultimately result in a
greater number of benefits to society that outweigh the potential harmful effects.8o This argument is an excellent starting point because it examines
many of the same factors relied on by opponents of gene patenting but
reaches an opposite conclusion.81 Specifically, when applying a utilitarian
framework, both sides will examine the economic, medical, and scientific
consequences of gene patenting82 and undergo a risk-utility analysis to determine whether the benefits outweigh the risks.
Initially, it is important to understand the consequences of the patent
system and how its regulation of genes affects economic factors and scientific discovery. First, patents are notoriously expensive and often take a long
time to obtain. According to one source, a total average cost of patenting a
highly complex invention is roughly $15,000 but can go well above that.83
To put that number in context, another source indicates the average expected
charge in 2004 for preparing and filing a utility patent application was
$12,373 for a relatively complex biotechnology/chemical application.84
Aside from the substantial costs, the average patent prosecution, the process
a patent application must undergo prior to the issuance of a patent, generally

79.
80.

Peter Barton Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 952-60 (3d
ed. 2007).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
See Holman, supra note 75 at 360-61.

81.

Id.

82.

Also, many policy concerns and utilitarian arguments focus on agricultural
consequences of gene patenting, which is beyond the scope of this article. For
an excellent article covering the policy concerns of the consequences of patenting genetic modifications in agriculture see Taiwo A. Oriola, Consumer Dilem-

78.

mas: The Right to Know, Safety, Ethics and Policy of Genetically Modified
Food, 2002 SING.

83.
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Gene Quinn, Cost of Obtaining a Patent, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent/

patent-cost/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
84.

Thomas C. Fiala & John E. Wright, Preparingand Prosecutinga Patent That
Holds up in Litigation, 875 PLI/PAT 515, 521-22 (2006).
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takes three to four years for extremely complex inventions.85 These figures
only reflect the claims that proceed through patent prosecution without obstruction and are subsequently free from litigation. The average estimated
cost of litigating a patent in 2005 ranged from $769,562 to $5,175,753, depending on the amount of damages at risk.86 A different study found that the
estimated cost of patent prosecution, maintenance, and management totaled
between $20,000 and $30,000 per patent. 87
Considering the amount of money required to obtain and defend a patent, proponents argue that patents are necessary to protect the holder's investment. Also, the patent system allows the owner to recuperate the costs
invested in development of the product by giving the owner a right to exclude all others from the use of the developed product. These positive economic consequences of the patent system in the context of gene patents can
be seen more clearly through examples of biotech firms. In February 2007,
the New York Times wrote on the struggles and successes of Xoma, Ltd.88
The article reports that the firm spent more than $700 million since its inception in 1981, without earning a profit or marketing a drug.89 Medically, its
efforts in developing antibody therapeutics have been invaluable, but like
many groups that are heavily involved in research and development, the directly marketable product is quite limited. This resulted in high expenses for
important and highly utilizable information, but little monetary profit. Another example is Celera Genomics, a biotech firm that spent $200 million per
year in research and design investment from 1997 to 2001 without turning a
profit.90

The fact that many biotech companies struggle to survive illuminates
the principle that investors are hesitant to buy into developing biotechnology
products that do not receive patent protection.91 Kevin Noonan, Ph.D., a bio85.

Bay Area Intellectual Property Group, L.L.C., Patent Information, Patents,
Search, and Invention Development, http://www.bayareaip.com/Services/Patent

86.

Application/NonProvisionals/NonProvisionals.htm#prosecution
Jan. 19, 2009).
Fiala, supra note 84, at 522.

(last visited
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available at http://www.nature.com.proxy.libraries.smu.edu/nbt/joumal/v24/
n1/full/nbtO106-31.html#f6.
See Andrew Pollack, It's Alive! Meet One of Biotech's Zombies, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb 11, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/1 I/business/your
money/1l xoma.html.
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technology patent law expert, explains that unpatented inventions would be
hidden as trade secrets or stolen by big companies.92 The consequences of
not providing patent protection include forcing U.S. companies to compete
against worldwide corporations who can drastically underpay their employees. 93 Moreover, there is a loss of incentives to follow product development
all the way to pharmaceutical success, thereby less pursuit of the production
of the next "miracle drug" and less public disclosure and stifling of the large
generics industry that relies on the expired patents. 94 Finally, it is important
to remember that the biotechnology industry itself has been largely developed by providing businesses with intellectual property rights through DNA
patterns. 95 As can be seen by examining the two biotech companies mentioned above, the substantial time and costs required to develop, produce,
test, market, and implement a biotech product necessitate a certain amount of
patent protection so the company can protect their research and development
investment. 96
Concerning diagnostic uses for gene patents, Adda Gogoris, an expert in
biotechnology patents stated:
Diagnostics are notoriously low-profit-margin products .

.

. If the

right to develop a diagnostic were to be shared by more than one
company, the economic incentive to develop it is likely to evaporate. Who would go through the development and approval process only [to compete] with another company for a low-profit
market?97
Perhaps the most common argument for gene patenting is that the patent
system promotes technological progress because it creates incentives for innovation. The United States Constitution specifically gives Congress the
right "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."98 Generally, patents are thought to facilitate
research by encouraging investment and guaranteeing the holder a way to
recoup what is often a substantial initial investment. A paper drafted by the
Nuffield Counsel on Bioethics ("NCB") states that "Protection by patents of
specific diagnostic tests which are based on DNA sequences could provide

92.

See id.

93.

See id.

94.

See id.

95.

See

96.

See id.

97.

See Surendran, supra note 51, at 496.
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an effective means of rewarding the inventor while providing an incentive for
others to develop alternate tests."99
At this time, it is critical to introduce an exception to infringement that
gene patenting proponents often raise as it relates to restrictions placed on
research. Almost 200 years ago, the Supreme Court created a common law
exception to infringement, called the Experimental Use Exception, which
courts have frequently applied to academic researchers.00 The Exception
provides relief from a patent infringement claim when the individual "conducted such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purposes of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects."lol The Experimental Use Exception does not inhibit research because it allows an inventor to utilize the collective academic knowledge to
pursue other ends. This doctrine serves as another example illustrating the
point that researchers are rarely restricted in their utilization of information,
although courts have narrowed the exception significantly. 102
Proponents of gene patenting argue that researchers articulate the genepatenting claims so narrowly in order not to inhibit innovation.103 While examining human gene patent litigation, Christopher Holman draws this same
conclusion and breaks down the claims into four categories.104 Concerning
human gene patent litigation involving infringement based on the recombinant production of a therapeutic protein, Holman found only one case where
a court found infringement, which resulted from the defendant's use of a
native human erythropoietin cDNA sequence the plaintiff's patent broadly
claimed.105 An overall view of his study indicates that courts commonly do
not find infringement in the case of human gene patents.10 6 Often, the parties
to the suit will settle out of court or the court will intervene and order arbitration.107 Holman concludes that human gene patents have a positive effect on
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the cost and availability of protein therapeutics.108 Additionally, an empirical
study conducted at Georgetown University concluded NIH guidelines, like
licensing practices and market forces, influence university practices more
than gene patents, which have minimal research-blocking effects.1o9
To summarize, gene patents are a method of reimbursement for the
companies, researchers and investors that put up substantial amounts of capital in the hopes of developing a significant pharmaceutical innovation. Patent protection provides security for the investment community who would
otherwise not invest in such a traditionally low-profit venture. Similarly, patent protection provides security and incentive to the individual researchers
undertaking the work. In reality, the small biotech firm that is supported by
substantial capital but still lacks a marketable product is essentially working
free of charge until they develop a marketable product, which for some remains an elusive accomplishment. Additionally, patent protection enables
the recovery of the large fees often associated with patent prosecution. Also,
patents make economic sense regarding genetic testing. Since profit margins
on the tests are generally quite low, if companies shared the profits, they
would be discouraged from investing substantial amounts. In summary, although the research is admittedly mixed, the latest studies do not support any
indication that granting gene patents blocks research efforts.
B.

The Case Against Gene Patents

The most common objections to gene patenting can be placed in two
broad categories, utilitarian and morallethical. Utilitarian objections often
involve the effect on the academic community's ability to engage in research
or the effect on access to information and testing, while moral/ethical objections primarily focus on the public health policy or the social policy in general. The OECD subdivided the utilitarian arguments into a useful
framework whereby research, commercialization, and clinical use issues all
fall under the concerns regarding patents procured and limited access to both
researchers and patients.'10

In stark contrast to the claim that gene patenting promotes innovation,
opponents maintain the view that patenting of genes actually inhibits innovation. This argument often takes many forms or labels. For instance, in 1998,
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg postulated the paradoxical effect of
the privatization of biomedical research called "the tragedy of the anticommons.""'1 According to this theory, a resource is prone to underuse when
multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource

108. Id. at 356.
109. See Pressman, supra note 87.

110. See Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices,
supra note 48, at 12.
111. See Heller, supra note 22.
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and no one has an effective privilege of use.I" 2 More specifically, when patent protection is granted, the access to the information is hindered and further
research efforts are choked. Efforts are choked because patents are said to
increase prices and restrict use because many researchers could hold fragmented patent claims that overlap with one another.13 The signs of this "anticommons" effect are theorized to be decreased scientific output, rising
patent licensing and equipment costs, reduced private sector investment, diminished entry of new scientists and companies, and increased concentration
of patent ownership.' 14 A patent thicket is a similar term defined as "an
overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize
a new technology obtain licenses for multiple patentees."''5 The result is a
failure to further the usefulness of the genetic information through a collective and cooperative academic environment.
The problem with the anticommons argument is twofold: the applicant
is required to provide a detailed written description of the invention,' 16 and
current research has failed to substantiate the claim.' 17 Regarding the first
reason, information concerning the invention and the manner of designing,
producing, and using the invention are completely disclosed to the public.
The Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement of disclosure as "the
quid pro quo of the right to exclude."118

The disclosure requirement has two implications that are important to
consider regarding their effect on research. First, the right to exclude others
is limited to "the claim language, the written description portion of the specification, the prosecution history, and if necessary to aid a court's understanding of the patent, extrinsic evidence."' '9 Due to the technical nature of gene
patents, the claims in the applications are extraordinarily detailed regarding
the sequence, process, and use. As such, research is generally not prohibited
because the right to exclude is limited to the specific claims made in the
patent application. For example, in Genzyme Corporation v. Transkaryotic
112. See id.
113. See id.

114. See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85
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1684 (2007).
115. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, I Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner, & Scott Stern eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.
edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2007).
117. See Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 114, at 1685.
118. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
119. Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d
1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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Therapies, Inc., Genzyme Corporation was the exclusive licensee of U.S.
Patent No. 5,356,804 (the '804 patent).12 0 Genzyme sued Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc. alleging patent infringement due to Transkaryotic's use of a
process called gene activation where a DNA sequence, acting as a promoter,
is inserted into a human host cell.121 Once inserted, the endogenous human
cellular gene encoding d-galactosidase A ("d-Gal A") is activated to express
the endogenous human d-Gal A protein.122 To determine whether Genzyme's
patent was infringed, the court looked to two specific claims in the patent
application, which stated in relevant part:
1. A method for producing human [d-Gal A] comprising: (a) culturing a mammalian cell containing a chromosomally integrated
nucleotide sequence encoding human [6-Gal A] controlled by a
regulatory sequence that promotes gene expression and a selectable marker controlled by the same or different regulatory sequence, so that the [A-Gal A] nucleotide sequence is stably overexpressed and an enzymatically active [d-Gal A] enzyme is secreted by the mammalian cell; and (b) isolating enzymatically active [6-Gal A] enzyme from the mammalian cell culture. 10. A
mammalian cell comprising a chromosomally integrated nucleotide sequence encoding human [6-Gal A] controlled by a regulatory sequence that promotes gene expression and a selectable
marker controlled by the same or different regulatory sequence, so
that the [6-Gal A] nucleotide sequence is stably overexpressed and
an enzymatically active [d-Gal A] enzyme is secreted by the mammalian cell.123
The court examined the claims and concluded that Transkaryotic's process of gene activation did not infringe on Genzyme's process because it
required the introduction of exogenous sequences encoding 6-Gal A into a
host cell, a process which Genzyme concedes that Transkaryotic's technique
does not utilize.124 In other words, even though the 6-Gal A gene was involved in the patent, that in itself does not preclude other researchers from
utilizing, toward an alternate ultimate goal, the information that was freely
disseminated as a result of the patent. As such, this patent did not prevent
other researchers from utilizing the same exact gene in another method. To
the contrary, it is likely that Genzyme's work fostered more research by laying an initial foundation upon which future tiers of investigation could be
built.
120. Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1096 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1105-06.
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Regarding the second problem with the anticommons argument, many
researchers have used empirical studies to refute the claim that research is
inhibited. In fact, the same paper by the NCB positing that the patent system
has advantages simultaneously warns that innovation may be inhibited by
increasing the cost of research to other scientists interested in the same sequence.125 Also, studies conducted from 2002 to 2006 in four countries indicate that anticommons problems are relatively infrequent, despite the large
number of patents and interested parties, such as pharmaceutical firms, biotech startups, universities, and governments.126 Another study that focused
on human gene patent litigation also concluded gene patents have had a modest impact in the context of genetic testing and research tools. It determined
there is not enough evidence to support the assertion that gene patents inhibit
innovation.127 A different study reached the same conclusion by examining
broad patent trends, patterns of patent ownership, and the distribution of patents across PTO patent subclasses.128 The study indicates that a "lack of
concerted control [of patents by large companies,] the rising number of patent applications, and the continuous record of new market entrants provide
strong evidence that biotechnology patenting is not adversely affecting innovation."29 In addition to demonstrating the lack of sufficient evidence to
determine the impact of any anticommons effect, the study also indicates that
both sides of the debate are oversimplifying the dynamics of patenting practices when they rely on patent count alone.130
Another major argument against gene patents concerns questionable licensing practices when holders of a patent grant exclusive licenses to firms.
This creates the possibility of abusing a monopoly by charging exorbitant
fees for diagnostic testing or associated procedures. This objection to gene
patenting touches on its economic consequences and claims that the patents
cause increased costs for new testing and treatment. The most widely cited
example of this practice is Myriad Genetics. The company entered into commercial agreements with numerous health management organizations and insurance companies across the globe. Critics claim that the broad nature of
the European patents, in conjunction with the licensing agreements, create
vulnerabilities to patent infringement lawsuits for other clinicians and European laboratories who utilize the new genetic techniques.131 For example,
125. See Vince, supra note 99.
126. See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: an Analysis of Human
Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092
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French BRCA testing performed "in-house" would cost approximately a
third of Myriad's price; complying with the patents and paying Myriad to
process the genetic test would result in an estimated additional $7.6 million
cost to hospital budgets.132 In late 2008, the European Patent Office ("EPO")
Appeals Board amended Myriad's patent to limit its scope to cover frameshift mutations in the BRCAl gene. While this limitation appears to be a
success for other European clinicians, the EPO decision creates uncertainty
because, given that the patent only partially covers a diagnostic method, it
will be difficult to determine where compliance ends and infringement begins.133 Regardless of the amendment, critics contend that Myriad's practice
of charging high licensing fees will discourage laboratories from providing
this very valuable genetic and diagnostic testing where the patent is in
force.134 As a result, there are very few laboratories available and the results
can take as long as three to four weeks until they are returned to the clinician.
This may exacerbate the already significant unrest and anxiety in the patient
who is awaiting such sensitive results.
Another example of questionable licensing agreements and subsequent
abuse of a monopoly can be seen in the case of Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc. Plaintiffs-individuals, families,

and institutions interested in curing Canavan disease-brought suit against
Miami Children's Hospital ("MCH") for conversion, claiming their financial
support led to the breakthrough discovery of the gene responsible for the
disease.135 A patent was issued for that discovery and for its related applications, such as diagnosis of and screening the Canavan disease.136 The plaintiffs claim they did not know of MCH's intent to obtain a patent and were
under the impression that the research would lead to carrier detection and
testing, which would be provided on an affordable and accessible basis.'37
At that point, MCH began to threaten enforcement action against the centers
offering Canavan testing, claiming they would restrict public access ability
through exclusive licensing agreements and the charging of royalty fees.138
The court held, consistent with Moore, that the plaintiffs have no cognizable
property interest in body tissue and genetic matter donated for research.139
Critics view cases like these as evidence of the ill effects of broad gene patents and the injustice that occurs when one entity is able to restrict access to
132. Id.
133. See id.

134. Id.
135. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
136. See id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (filed Sept. 9, 1994).
137. See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 1074-75.
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diagnostic and treatment tools that were developed, to some extent, by a
community of supporters who pooled resources for the benefit of all. The
common fear, and the plaintiffs' cry in Greenberg, is that "[patent holders
will] beg[i]n restricting public accessibility through negotiating exclusive licensing agreements and charging royalty fees."40 A separate, but related,
argument regarding the high costs of medical testing and treatment is that
opponents claim it is unfair for private companies to realize high profits from
research that was sponsored and funded by the Government.141 As discussed
above, the Bayh-Dole Act allowed the private sector to take a giant leap in
securing intellectual property rights in their products. Opponents argue the
Act merely allows private companies to profit from public investments in
research. Specifically, one opponent has argued that the Act takes the power
away from the Government to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies to
provide reasonably priced drugs.142 The argument relies upon the fact that
many medical innovations result from research funded by the public-sector,
yet private biotechnology firms reap enormous benefits despite the ever increasing cost of testing and treatment in the United States.143
Many objections to gene patents are based on either moral grounds or
public policy concerns. Skepticism seems to stem from the idea of a patent
covering an inherent part of the human organism. For instance, the human
genome has been characterized as a "blueprint of life" by President Bill Clinton on January 27, 2000, in his State of the Union Address.144 Similarly, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
declared that, "[t]he human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all
members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent
indignity and diversity. In the symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity."l45 Genes, by their very nature, are the essence of who we are, and people often object to the fact that a researcher, who has successfully
characterized a genetic mutation, is given a patent and thereby appears to
somehow have a stake in our physical autonomy. The European Commission's patent laws forbid patents that are contrary to public morality.146 The
Commission considered the issue of whether or not DNA patenting degrades
140. See id. at 1065.
141. See RESNIK, supra note 90, at 69.
142. See Merrill Goozner, The Price Isn't Right, THE AMERICAN PROSPEcr, September 11, 2000, at 25 (providing substantial evidence that government-funded
research is responsible for a majority of medically significant knowledge).
143. See id.

144. William J. Clinton, Eighth State of the Union Address (Jan. 27 2000).
145. G.A. Res. 152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152 (March 10, 1999).
146. RESNIK, supra note 90, at 62; see also Article 6, Directive 98/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of Council of 6 July 1998 (hereinafter "EPC Article
6"), availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
1998:213:0013:0021 :EN:PDF.
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human dignity when the European Patent Convention convened.14 7 Conversely, the effects of gene patenting on morality and human dignity are
largely absent in United States case law. For example, neither Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion nor Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabartyincludes any discussion of the moral implications of
gene patenting.148 Essentially, opponents raise a plethora of moral arguments
such as: it is morally wrong to allow the patenting of natural things that are
created by God; it is repugnant and contrary to public policy to commodify
the human body and nature; and DNA is humanity's common property and,
as such, it should not be owned by private individuals. Traces of the latter
argument can be seen in President Clinton's speech and UNESCO's declaration. One implication of gene patenting that serves as a grounds for objection is the commercialization of the human body. The negative
consequences can manifest in different ways. For example, the plaintiff in
Moore had abnormal T-lymphocytes that produced an abundance of
lymphokines, "thus making the corresponding genetic material easier to identify."I49 This made the plaintiff's cells particularly valuable.150 They were so
valuable that the doctors responsible for Moore's health failed to disclose
their personal financial motives before harvesting his cells.'5i Aside from
unethical conduct, critics also object to this type of commercialization from
an evolutionary perspective. They claim that the future of genetic engineering lies in the ability to genetically modify human offspring. What parents, if
given the chance to guarantee their future generation is inoculated from the
HIV virus, bipolar disorder, Alzheimer's disease, and a host of other genetic
disorders, would not do so if financially able? Who would not bolster their
children's physical and cognitive abilities? Opponents would say these practices, supported by gene patents, could result in a genetics arms race where
the affluent and wealthy have the ability to genetically enhance the next generation while the less fortunate go without such options.
Other objections are seemingly based on both negative publicity and
misunderstandings of and about the patent system. Disastrous events obviously adversely impact the public perception of gene patenting. For example, the medical community and the public at large were shocked when on
September 17, 1999, 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died while undergoing experimental gene therapy at the University of Pennsylvania.152 Jesse was involved in the gene therapy trial in an attempt to correct or alleviate a genetic
147. See EPC Article 6.
148. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
149. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 483.
152. Nicholas Wade, Patient Dies During a Trial of Therapy Using Genes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fulIpage.html?
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defect that prevented the correct metabolism of ammonia.153 He, like other
participants, was given an infusion of corrective genes, encased in a genetically engineered adenovirus.154 The doctors speculate that the virus triggered
an inflammatory reaction which subsequently caused multiple organ systems
to fail.155 A subsequent investigation by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") and the NIH revealed that gene therapy researchers were not following all of the federal rules requiring them to report unexpected adverse
events associated with the gene therapy trials.156 For instance, "researchers
entered [Jesse] into the trial as a substitute for another volunteer who
dropped out," even though "[Jesse's] high ammonia levels at the time of the
treatment should have excluded him from the study."57 Jesse's death had a
chilling effect on gene therapy research as the FDA closed the trial at the
University of Pennsylvania, suspended gene therapy trials, and launched random inspections of other clinical trials nationwide.158 Three years later, officials in the United States and France "suspended four gene therapy
experiments because the treatment" may have resulted in a three-year-old
boy's acquisition of an illness similar to leukemia.159 While it is not certain
the gene therapy was causally related to the boy's illness, Dr. W. French
Anderson, one of the first scientists to use gene therapy to treat severe combined immune deficiency, stated that "gene therapy was likely
responsible." 160
An additional example is Jolee Mohr, who, on July 24, 2007, died from
a fungal infection, massive internal bleeding, and organ failure which arose
during experimental gene therapy-the goal of which was to determine the
safety and potential negative effects of the treatment.161 Ultimately, investigations by company scientists and an NIH expert panel found no evidence
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that the treatment was at fault, and FDA has given the company, Targeted
Genetics, permission to resume human testing.62
It may be argued that many individuals who are unfamiliar with gene
patenting pose objections based on this negative publicity. While advances
and breakthroughs are often lauded in academic journals, rarely does that
information make headline news. However, when we hear that someone died
as a result of experimental gene therapy, suddenly the risks appear more salient than the benefits and people object. The information delivered to the
public seems to be inequitably presented. Despite these tragic losses, genetic
engineering and gene therapy research is becoming increasingly safer. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have recently created
a new polymer that replaces the viruses' former function of delivering experimental gene products into the human body, thereby creating a safer, more
immunologically neutral factor for transmission of products.163 As a result,
many of the public concerns are unfounded and essentially amount to "genetic sensationalism."
In summation, opponents of gene patenting claim the practice is resulting in a "tragedy of the anticommons" where patent holders have the same
stake in a particular subject matter due to the precise detail required to create
a claim and invention.164 Challengers of gene patenting also argue that researchers will be paralyzed with uncertainty regarding whether they should
use the nucleotide sequence or process-they will either be subject to a lawsuit or forced to abandon their efforts entirely, instead directing their research
to an area where no patents are held.165 Critics also claim this patenting
process restricts progress, prevents academic cooperation, and frustrates research efforts because patenting genes can restrict access to affordable genetic testing as patent holders are able to exclude other researchers from
using their cell line or method.166 There is also the potential for patent holders to charge any fee they desire, which exacerbates the problem of providing
affordable and effective therapy and diagnosis capabilities to the people suffering from the disease, which is ultimately what the discovery was designed
to address.167
Critics cite Myriad Genetics and Miami Hospital as prime examples of
how patent holders can abuse their monopoly by restricting access through
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licensing agreements and royalty payments.168 Opponents also denounce
gene patents as morally repugnant and contrary to public policy.169 These
objections emphasize the position that we "should not play God" or trivialize
human dignity by turning it into a commodity. Still, perhaps others object
based on a limited knowledge or misunderstanding about the patent system
and negative news publicity. 70 Some people may conflate owning a gene
patent with having ownership rights in one's genes. It is evident that the
general public may object to genetic patents on a number of different moral
based grounds as a result of "genetic sensationalism."17, In other words, the
public is provided an infinitesimal amount of information that is easy to misinterpret if one is not knowledgeable about the patent laws. What makes
matters worse is when respected individuals, such as Michael Crichton, become very vocal about one aspect of the debate which greatly influences
many people.172 The average layperson is not presented with a systematic
analysis of the benefits and risks of gene patents and the one-sided bombardment erroneously amplifies public emotion.
IV.

LOOKING AHEAD

At this point, it is necessary to reevaluate the arguments, discard the
arguments that are based on erroneous assumptions or misconceptions, and
analyze the resulting strong positions to determine, among other things, gaps
in the existing research and areas in need of improvement. It appears as
though a combination of factors has given rise to a certain degree of skepticism and sensationalism regarding gene patenting. Only when the debate is
boiled down to its truthful and essential components can society take action
to defend against adverse consequences.
Over the years, many multifaceted arguments that have been espoused
regarding the moral objections to gene patenting, and a detailed analysis of
the many arguments for and against DNA patents is beyond the scope of this
article. Certainly, morality should be considered when legislation is being
written or passed, in judges' rulings on the bench, and at the forefront of
individuals' minds when establishing licensing arrangements. However, the
PTO has established that when a genetic sequence is altered, the natural compound becomes a compound that is patentable due to human ingenuity.13 As
such, the USPTO has articulated a standard where a distinction is drawn between an abstract idea and a legitimate and concrete application of an idea.
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Within this framework, many of the moral arguments seem to lack strength
in that they fail to consider the positive and the adverse consequences of gene
patenting, and instead, maintain that the practice should not exist. To the
contrary, genetic patenting has persisted in the face of legislation attempting
to ban the practice and is highly likely to become more prolific.
That being said, morality and ethics play a vital role in how gene patents
should be regulated to maximize the benefits to pharmaceutical companies
and patients alike. This is especially true when one speculates about the
future of genetic modification and enhancement. There appears to be a telescoping nature of technology. It took approximately two billion years for life
to exist, six million years for the hominid and 100,000 years for mankind. In
more recent times, there is a further time crunch related to technology.
10,000 years for the development of agriculture, 400 years for the scientific
revolution in the Renaissance and 150 years for the industrial revolution.
There is no doubt that within our lifetime, genetic manipulation will reach a
level where parents will be able to safeguard their young through genetic
enhancement. It is likely that the modifications will seem innocuous and in
violation of either public policy or morality. The modifications will provide
a way to prevent the destructive and often hereditary disease of bipolar disorder or alcohol addiction. No one will object to a genetic enhancement that
will cure a genetic abnormality. However, what if parents were able to physically or cognitively enhance their unborn children in utero? Or, what if they
could increase their children's height, improve their reflexes, or even enhance memory? How will these practices be regulated, if at all? This is
where ethical considerations play an enormous role. The moral argument is
well-placed as the only basis for objection to an extremely useful practice,
and it is extremely important for an arbiter to determine to what extent society should continue forward with genetic issues.
Whether a system of DNA patents inhibits or promotes scientific innovation is more unclear. Earlier researchers and scholars thought a network of
patents would create an environment where similarly situated holders would
be in the position to exclude each other. Heller and Eisenberg suggest two
instances where patents may increase the transaction costs of product development, thereby inhibiting scientific research.174 First, an anticommons effect can be created by creating too many concurrent fragments of intellectual
property rights on future products. 75 For example, the authors state the example that a Lexis search of the phrase "adrenergic receptor" disclosed more
than 100 U.S. patents with that phrase in the claim language. 7 6 As such,
biotechnology firms will be unable to obtain a complete set of licenses,
which would deter the pursuit of that project.177 The second anticommons
174. See Heller, supra note 22, at 699.
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scenario arises when too many upstream patent owners stack licenses on top
of the future discoveries of downstream users. 78 In other words, the use of
reach-through licensing agreements could inhibit innovation because the patent holders stack overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential downstream products, essentially giving the patent holder continuing rights, often
in the form of a royalty on sales, and exclusive or nonexclusive license on
future discoveries, or an option to acquire such a license for future products.1 79 However, despite the theoretical plausibility of this theory, the predicted effects have not been found. Moreover, the assertion is not consistent
with other studies, relevant case law and available data regarding the concentration of patent control, the yearly number of patent applications, and the
amount of investment in the biotechnology industry from the private and
public sector. For instance, many other studies have not found the predicted
effects to either be nominal or nonexistent.180
There has been a history of public outcry concerning gene patenting that
continues today. However, the interesting question is, considering the documented effects on research and access to treatment, why do the objections
persist? A number of scholars have proposed a solution which merits a brief
discussion. The idea posits that the general public and legislators have a
tendency to treat genetics as fundamentally different from other biological
subject matter, and thus enact gene-specific legislation.18, This phenomenon,
known as "Genetic Exceptionalism," "allows elected officials to avoid difficult issues by enacting genetic-specific laws that seem to respond to a perceived new crisis, but in fact offer little or no protection and may even be
counterproductive."182 One scholar sarcastically stated, "It is not surprising
that elected officials would want to avoid fundamental and controversial issues and focus instead on nominally protecting the public against the highly
publicized evils of invidious genetic discrimination." 183 This phenomenon
relates to the negative publicity argument, or genetic sensationalism, articulated above. Essentially, ill-informed members of the public catch wind of a
negative headline related to DNA patents and, being ignorant of the law, feel
a sense of urgency and uneasiness. However, after sorting through the mis178. See id at 699-700.
179. See id.
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conceptions, it is evident that humanity need not fear that another individual
or institution "owns" your genes.
Ideally, the road to improved regulation would be straight and clear and
decisions would be based on a detailed risk assessment in which the consequences of DNA patenting are evaluated. However, it is likely that the academic community is still largely ignorant regarding many of the potential
harms of gene patenting. Therefore, policy recommendations need be made
with the understanding that the regulation should be flexible in order to accommodate newly discovered evidence. After reviewing the literature, many
suggestions can be made and discussed in the academic community to mitigate the negative effects of gene patenting while maintaining their benefits.
First, something must be done to cut down on the expenses and lengthy delays of patent prosecution. As noted above, the costs of developing a genetically engineered product are costly; it sometimes takes years to go through
the patent prosecution process. Perhaps granting an extension to the patent
life for the length of time in prosecution, or minimizing the fees required to
file, could provide further incentives for innovation and greater security.
However, before this suggestion can be implemented, a task force should be
created to examine what the effects would be on the generic drug industry.
At first blush, the extension of the patents life would cause a manufacturer of
generic drugs to delay use of the information, thus the price of the treatment
would remain high.
Another option would be to create a subdivision in the FDA specifically
to monitor experimental testing facilities to ensure compliance with guidelines. According to the follow-up investigations for the few deaths associated with gene therapy, the testing facilities neglected the required reporting
of many mishaps. Whether the institutions conducting the research did not
know the federal requirements or had knowledge of the requirements but
chose not to comply, there is a necessity for stricter scrutiny and careful
documentation in experimental genetics. Another suggestion would be to
advise the PTO about the ill effects of granting patents with broad claims,
which vests too much control in one holder and hinders research. Also, the
PTO and FDA could corroborate and set up special committees within their
respective agencies, for the sole purpose of expediting gene patents which
have potential applications in clinical diagnosis and treatment. Thus, when a
new miracle drug is discovered, it could be brought to the market safely and
efficiently to maximize the drug's benefit. Additionally, one scholar has suggested the establishment of an ethics board that sits apart from the patent
office and to provide clear guidelines regarding current concerns.184 To effectuate a speedy process, an ethics board would only accept applications
that pose significant ethical questions. The purpose of the board would be to
balance the many benefits of genetic patenting and to add an ethical voice to
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the patent prosecution process. The author notes that such a board should be
able to suspend the power to enforce the patent which would provide the
flexibility needed to deal with patents that truly raise an ethical concern,
while not slowing down the process of patent examination.185
Congress could also set up licensing laws for gene patents to protect
against potential abuses and foul play, such as enacting legislation to prohibit
the number of subleases a patent holder can make in an effort to avoid patent
thickets. Furthermore, Congress should codify the "experimental use" exception in patent law and provide a carefully articulated and clear definition
so that patent agencies and researchers can better utilize this exception. With
the changing administration and the economy in a downslide, the President
can encourage private investment in the biotech industry and perhaps provide
more federal funding to the research institutions and universities. As an
aside, researchers who collect tissue or cell samples should inform the participants of the potential monetary value of the material, as well as any intent
to patent DNA sequences. Despite the lack of a requirement that researchers
compensate the participants, the disclosure would provide a greater level of
informed consent.
Thanks to many scholars, there is ample research regarding the impact
of human gene patent litigation,186 whether those gene patents accorded with
the purposes of the United States patent system, 8 7 and how DNA sequences
meet the requirement of utility and are patentable subject matter.188 However, more research is needed regarding the economics and potential effects
that gene patents have on research in the academic and clinical community.
The current literature is replete with inconsistent findings, including a lack of
repetitive efforts to replicate findings and a lack of a standard on which to
measure these effects. Specifically, the finding that the "anticommons tragedy" is uncommon does not mean that research is not being inhibited.189 The
reports indicate "the effects are much less prevalent than would be expected
if its hypothesized mechanisms were in fact operating."90 However, this is
merely stating that the effects are a matter of degree. Research still may be
inhibited due to the granting of patents and fear of infringement. Moreover,
the research should be limited to a specific geographic area. Patenting an
invention in one country does not preclude the use of that invention in another country. This is why biotechnology companies are seeking patents
from the PTO and the EPO.
185. See id.
186. See Holman, supra note 75.
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Since patents are territorial in nature, they should be analyzed individually. After individual countries are analyzed, a meta-analysis can be performed to search for research inhibiting patterns worldwide. However, it is
important that statistical analyses do not rely on patent counts alone. Rather,
the research should examine the amount of control over patents exerted by
large companies, the number of patent applications that are filed each year,
as well as the number of patents that are granted, and the amount of companies that are entering the biotechnology industry.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite a tumultuous early history, the patenting of genetic materials
and processes is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence and has resisted
adverse legislation as well as international warnings. Many of the benefits of
gene patenting have been realized to some extent. Since 1992, billions of
dollars have poured into the biotechnology industry from public and private
sector investment. This explosion of scientific knowledge has created
thousands of jobs, spurred research and innovation resulting in an untold
number of medical advances, and enhanced academia by creating a close
association between public/government institutions and private research
firms. Genetic disorders, which were once crippling and/or killing thousands
of people, are now curable by relatively simple procedures. Testing procedures have been developed that allow early detection of ailments, thereby
increasing the window of treatability and, ultimately, curability.
Unfortunately, the risks of gene patenting have been realized to a much
lesser extent. Many historical examples of the negative consequences surrounding gene patenting can be utilized to understand where protection is
lacking and how the practice can be regulated more efficiently. For example,
scientists are more commonly foregoing the use of viruses as a vector in gene
therapy for a safer polymer. But for the unfortunate death of a young man
undergoing gene therapy, an alternate form of delivery would not likely have
been developed. But for Jessie's death, the FDA and NIH would not have
been alerted to the frequent reporting violations and lackadaisical practices
by the researchers. In other words, these adverse consequences, albeit tragic,
do not support a strong argument for limiting the patenting of genetic material. All scientific innovation would come to a screeching halt if practices
were banned that could potentially have adverse consequences. Researchers
and scientists can only create regulations to minimize these effects, and when
bad results occur, the lessons should be learned from them. The FDA and
other industries that can monitor genetic diagnosis and treatment must increase their oversight. These procedures and regulations that attempt to provide protection for the public will provide no value if they are not followed.
In conclusion, the advent of patenting genetic material has raised a myriad of ethical concerns that have been augmented by sensationalism and misconceptions about the law. While they cannot provide strong bases for
banning the practice, the ethical objections will play an increasingly important role as genetic modification/enhancement progresses. For now, it is im-
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portant to recognize that society has received substantial benefits from
research efforts that likely would not have taken place but for patent protection. The most recent research suggests that scientific research is not inhibited, but is actually promoted by granting certain genetic material patent
protection. Biotechnology research is an extremely risky venture that often
yields no results. To perpetuate and encourage investment and research, patent protection is simply a necessity as a means to an end. Patent protection
on biological subject matter creates incentives for the blossoming industry of
biotechnology. Reaching the conclusion that patenting genetic material results in more positive consequences than negative, does not mean there
should be no limit in the way patent protection can be granted and regulated.
Certainly some of these suggestions should be considered in an effort to safeguard human safety and values. The future is uncertain and as human ingenuity grows at an exponential rate, society will face many difficult legal
decisions on how far these practices should be extended. Mechanisms such
as a separate office within the PTO or an ethics review board should be in
place to readily deal with these kinds of decisions.

